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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREMONT COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision ofthe state ofIdaho, Supreme Court Docket No. 41584-2013 
RONALD "SKIP" HURT, individually and in 
his official capacity, and LEROY MILLER, Fremont County District Court No. 2012-580 
individually and in his official capacity, 
Respondents - Appellants, 
v. 
FL YING "A" RANCH, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, CLEN ATCHLEY, EMMA 
ATCHLEY, LAURA PICKARD, CLAY 
PICKARD, GEORGE TY NEDROW, and 
DAVID TUK NEDROW, 
Petitioners - Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
Honorable GREGORY MOELLER, District Judge, Presiding. 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
Nathan R. Starnes, Esq. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Phone: (208) 522-3003 
Fax: (208) 621-3008 
Attorneys for Appellants/Respondents 
Lynn Hossner, Esq. 
109 N 2nd W 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Phone: (208) 624-3782 
Fax: (208) 624-3783 
Attorney for Respondents! Petitioners 
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The Applicable Standard of Review For This Court is a De Novo Review. 
Respondent erroneously suggests that the Commissioners' reference to errors made by 
the district court converts the applicable review standard to an abuse of discretion standard. 
There is no legal precedent to convert a review standard because references were made to the 
district court acting in its appellate capacity. The Commissioners specifically articulated the 
applicable standard of review, identifying it as a de novo review. See Appellant's Brief, p. 11-
12. See also Black Labrador Investing, LLC v. Kuna City Council, 147 Idaho 92, 95,205 P.3d 
1228, 1231 (2008) (holding that the Idaho Supreme Court "review [ s] the agency record 
independently of the district court's decision."). Rather, the Commissioners specifically 
highlighted legal errors of the district court to ensure this Court understood why the lower court 
erred in its reasoning to invalidate the Commissioners' decision. Highlighting the errors of the 
district court serves to frame the issues on appeal and specifically address issues that the 
Appellants believe need specific attention of this Court. In fact, using the errors in the lower 
court's decision assists in articulating what the correct outcome should be in a review by this 
Court. Thus, there is no substance to Respondent's suggestion that the standard of review has 
been altered. As such, any contention that the Commissioners' decision should be invalidated 
because the district court did not abuse its discretion is inappropriate. Ultimately, the 
appropriate and only applicable standard of review of the Commissioners' decision adopting the 
initial county map is a de novo review ofthe initial Commissioners' decision. 
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B. Respondent Erroneously Suggests Integration of a Road Validation Proceeding 
With a Proceeding Adopting An Initial County Map. 
It is clear from Respondent's Brief that Respondents are advocating for a road validation 
proceeding to be integrated with the proceedings for adopting an initial county map pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 40-202. There is no statutory or other legal basis for this argument. Rather, the 
requirements imposed by § 40-202 in the adoption of the initial Official County Map are clear: 
The initial selection of the county highway system and highway district 
system may be accomplished in the following manner: 
(a) The board of county or highway district commissioners 
shall cause a map to be prepared showing the general 
location of each highway and public right-of-way in its 
jurisdiction, and the commissioners shall cause notice to be 
given of intention to adopt the map as the official map of 
that system, and shall specifY the time and place at which 
all interested persons may be heard. 
(b) After the hearing, the commissioners shall adopt the 
map, with any changes or revisions considered by them to 
be advisable in the public interest, as the official map of 
the respective highway system. 
I.C. § 40-202(1) (emphasis added). First, it is important to note that Respondents have not 
articulated any failure ofthe Commissioners related to compliance with the notice and hearing. 
Rather, their only objection is whether the placement of a single road on the initial map was 
contrary to section 40-202(1). Contrary to Respondent's assertions, the applicable standard 
when adopting the initial county map are including changes and revisions that may be 
"advisable in the public interest" and not "substantial and competent evidence" for inclusion of a 
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road. Specific factual detenninations for each road placed on the initial county map are 
not required. Under Respondent's analysis, a full evidentiary hearing for each road placed on 
the map would be required. Such a burdensome procedure was neither contemplated nor 
articulated by the plain statutory language of Section 40-202(1). Had the legislature intended a 
more burdensome approach, it would have articulated a process requiring a validation 
proceeding for disputed roads. 
Respondent inappropriately devotes an inordinate amount of time discussing the failure 
of the Commissioners to articulate a full and complete analysis of whether the North Road was 
actually an R.S. 2477 road. The uniqueness of a R.S. 2477 road and its legal nuances have no 
relevance to a 40-202(1) proceeding. Appellants concede that the record in its current state 
would not satisfy the legal standard of a validation proceeding where the full record would be 
gathered and presented, including the full historical nature of the North Road and its satisfaction 
ofR.S. 2477 requirements. 
The distinction between a § 40-202(1) proceeding and a § 40-203A proceeding are 
drastically different and the record would likewise reflect the differing analysis under each. That 
is, adoption of the initial map under § 40-202(1) is a legislative act required of the 
Commissioners. In so acting, the entire purpose of the action is to adopt the initial county map 
without the Commissioners attempting to adjudicate the legal status of any road as being public 
or private. Rather, there is an entirely separate proceeding that is devoted to adjudication of the 
status of a road, which is articulated in § 40-202 and 40-203A. In a § 40-203A proceeding, the 
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are acting a quasi-judicial capacity thereby considering evidence of a specific 
road and whether the evidence supports a finding of the road being a public or private road. It 
goes without saying that the record for a 40-202( 1) proceeding would necessarily be deficient 
under a § 40-203A standard. The divergent focus of the two proceedings requires distinct 
evidence to be considered in each proceeding. 
Contrary to Respondent, § 40-202 imposes no requirements on the Commissioners to 
consider the underlying status of how a road was initially created when adopting the initial 
public map. If the road appears to be public it should be designated as such for purposes of the 
initial public map. The inquiry is whether including a road on the initial public map is in the 
interest of the public and not whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support such 
a finding. Any discussion ofR.S. 2477 is irrelevant to the instant proceeding and such 
discussion would appropriately be reviewed and analyzed in a road validation proceeding 
initiated under § 40-203A. 
Respondent suggests that including the North Road as a R.S. 2477 Road was 
inappropriate and some official documentation of its initial declaration as a R.S. 2477 road was 
required. This position is not supported by statute or case law. The Commissioners were required 
to consider whether including the North Road on the initial map was in the public's interest. If 
the road was indeed a R.S. 2477 Road it cannot be private under existing federal and state law. 
Thus, where there was evidence that appeared to identify the road as a R.S. 2477 Road, inclusion 
is appropriate. By so including the road, the County has made it clear to the public that it 
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believes the road to be public stilI a challenge to the ~"L~''''O through a 
proceeding. Thus, Respondents should have followed the statutory requirements of § 40-203A 
to challenge the public nature of the North Road. 
In sum, the Commissioners complied with the express statutory requirements for the 
adoption of an initial Official County Map under Idaho Code § 40-202(1). Section 40-202(1) 
does not require any factual determination as to each road placed on the initial official county 
map. The appropriate avenue to challenge the validity of a road designated as a public road, 
such as the North Road, is to pursue a validation proceeding pursuant to § 40-203A. By 
initiating the action under § 40-203A, the Commissioners will have a fully developed record that 
will allow for a proper determination of the North Road. Here, the Commissioners' action in 
adopting Fremont County Ordinance No. 2013-01 did not involve consideration of a specific 
road but was for the general adoption of the initial county map. The evidence considered and 
the resulting record for action carried out pursuant to § 40-202 drastically varies from an action 
pursued under § 40-203A. As such, this Court should find that the Commissioners complied 
with the statutory requirements for the adoption of the initial Fremont County Official Road 
Map and uphold their inclusion of the North Road on said map as appropriate and in compliance 
with the applicable standard of Idaho Code § 40-202(1). 
5 
The Board of County Commissioners' Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Satisfied the Requirements of Idaho Code § 40-208(7). 
Based on the applicable standards identified under § 40-202, the Commissioners adoption 
of Fremont County Ordinance No. 2013-01 complied with the requirements ofIdaho Code § 40-
208(7): 
(a) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) In excess of the statutory authority of the commissioners; 
( c) Made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) Affected by other error of law; 
( e) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and 
substantial infonnation on the whole record; or 
(f) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion 
or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. 
I.C. § 40-208(7). The record before this Court is clear that the Commissions adoption of the 
Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law Re: Official Road Map of Fremont County Idaho (R., 
pp. 72-75) was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or an unwarranted exercise of 
discretion. The adoption of the initial Official County Map was the culmination of several years 
of work by the Fremont County Public Works Department wherein they researched various ITD 
inventory maps, Forest Service and BLM maps and detennined that all of the roads, including 
the North Road, were appropriately classified as a public road to be included on the initial Public 
Map. (R., p. 72, ~ 5). The Public Works Department necessarily included roads asserted under 
R.S.2477. The North Road was designated as a R.S. 2477 Road and designated as such on the 
initial county map. 
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The Respondents fail to even address the applicable authority of Homestead Farms, 
v. Board of Com 'rs of Teton County, 141 Idaho 855, 119 P.3d 630 (2005), which identified what 
evidentiary standard used to include a road on a county map. Homestead Farms. The Court 
specifically articulated that inclusion of a road on a public map should have "some basis through 
dedication, purchase, prescriptive use or some other accepted means of creating a public 
highway so there is some evidentiary support for the Commissioner's determination to 
designate a road on the map." Id. at 861, 119 P.3d at 636 (emphasis added). The Homestead 
Farms Court further recognized that inclusion of a road on the official map "does not also serve 
to adjudicate the public status of any roads within the county or create new public highways or 
rights-of-way." Id. at 859-60,119 P.3d at 634-35. Thus, this Court has already recognized that 
placement of a road on the official map is not a legal determination as to the status of the road, 
presumably reflecting the significant distinction between a validation proceeding and adoption of 
an official county map. 
In adopting the Conclusions of Law, the Commissioners had more than "some 
evidentiary support" to include the North Road on the map. The Commissioners had the 
substantial work of the Fremont County Public Works Department, which had reviewed other 
maps of the area and included all public roads it could ascertain. Additionally, the 
Commissioners specifically addressed the concerns of the Respondents prior to adopting the 
final initial official map in an October 15, 2012 work meeting. During that meeting, the 
Commissions specifically recognized that an old 1957 Shell Oil map identified the North Road 
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as access road to Federal BLM land. This finding alone is "some basis" to conclude that the 
North Road should be placed on the initial official road map as a public road. Thus, irrespective 
of the Commissioners inclusion of the language "substantial and competent evidence" to support 
the inclusion of the North Road, the applicable standard is that there be "some basis" to include 
the road and that such inclusion be "advisable in the public interest." In this case, there was, at a 
minimum, "some evidence" that the North Road should be included as a public road and the 
Commissioners recognized that such inclusion was "found to be in the public interest." (R., p. 
74, ,-r 7). Accordingly, the Commissioners' decision to include the North Road on the initial 
Official County Map was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion and this Court 
should confirm the Commissioners' adoption of Fremont County Ordinance No. 2013-01. 
D. Respondents Are Not Entitled To Attorneys' Fees Because the Instant Appeal Was 
Not "Without a Reasonable Basis In Fact or Law." 
Respondents' request an award of attorneys' fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
117. The standard for an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to § 12-117 is well-established and 
requires that the losing party act "without a reasonable basis in fact or law" before fees can be 
awarded. See Lake CDA Investments LLC v. Idaho Dep '[ of Lands, 149 Idaho 274, 284, 233 
P.3d 721, 731 (2010) (explaining the requirement that a losing party act unreasonably in the 
litigation before I.C. § 12-117 applies). Thus, Respondents would have to demonstrate that the 
Commissioners pursued this matter frivolously or without foundation. City of Osburn v. Randel, 
152 Idaho 906, 910, 277 P.3d 353, 357 (2012). The Respondents cannot satisfy this burden. 
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Here, there is no support that the Commissioners have acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law in pursuing this appeal. The issue before this Court is whether Idaho Code § 40-
202(1) requires substantial evidence in the record to adopt an initial county map. The findings 
of the lower court required additional elements that are not found in the plain language of § 40-
202. Furthermore, there was "some evidence" to support the inclusion of the North Road on the 
initial Fremont County map. The Commissioners have pursued this appeal because the 
requirements of the lower court do not comport with the plain reading of § 40-202 and therefore 
there is a reasonable basis for this appeal. Accordingly, should the Court find that the 
Commissioners' adoption of Fremont County Ordinance No. 2013-01 was arbitrary, capricious, 
or an abuse of discretion, the Court should still deny an award of attorneys' fees under § 12-117. 
Submitted this 30 day of April, 2014. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this 3D day of April, 2014, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage affixed thereto, 
facsimile, or overnight mail. 
Lynn Hossner, Esq. 
109 N 2nd W 
St. Anthony, ID 83445 
Fax: (208) 624-3783 
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